I.
tntroductiOfl CustomarilY, discussions of state revenue forecasting are consigned to the pages of journals on government administration.
In recent months, however, the problems caused by large underestimates of revenues in California, Massachusetts and New
York have received substantial publicity in the national press. The situation in Massachusetts has received particular attention due to the Presidential aspirations of Governor Michael Dukakis.
The Dukakis campaign has emphasized his superb managerial skills.
Critics of Dukakis argue that the revenue shortfall in
Massachusetts is evidence that these skills are not all that they are cracked up to be. For example, after the magnitude of the revenue shortfall became public, The Wall Street Journal approvingly quoted a Massachusetts official who said, "The Massachusetts Miracle is starting to sound like the last days of Pompeii. "1 While we do not believe that good revenue forecasting is a necessarily the sine qua non for good administration, neither is it a trivial matter. After all, sensible deliberations about expenditures cannot be made in the absence of "good" forecasts.
Indeed, in the presence of constitutional or statutory provisions for balanced budgets, unanticipated changes in revenues can wreak havoc not only on projects that are scheduled for funding, but on plans that have already been put into effect as well. Hence, we believe that an evaluation of an administration's forecasting 'Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1988, page 22. 1 ability plays an important role in assessing its overall compe t ence.
The first thing to realize when conducting such an evaluation is that state revenue forecasters operate Lfl an environment characterized by great uncertainty. Future revenues generated by a given revenue structure depend on future values of variables like employment, population, and nominal income, none of which is easy to predict.
Additional uncertainty is created since the state tax structure itself may be changed in the future. Such changes depend in part on the political climate in the state, another thing that is hard to predict. Operating in such an environment, forecasters cannot be expected to obtain precisely correct answers.
Related to this point is the observation that it is not sensible to evaluate an administration solely on the basis of any given year's outcome. Due to random fluctuations any particular forecast may be quite "bad," and this is not necessarily the "fault" of the administration.
Indeed The final responsibility lies with the governor, who reviews the forecasts, and can modify them before presentation.
Massachusetts is typical in these respects. The forecasting process begins in the October preceding the budget address, and a set of figures is produced by the Bureau of Administration and Finance (BA&F) in November. However, these figures are usually revised once or twice before the budget message goes to press in January.
Revenue forecasting methods differ widely across the states. politicians and journalists appear to regard over-optimistic revenue forecasts as being worse than over-pessimistic ones. (See Feenberg, et al. (1988] .)
In any case, as we emphasized in the previous section1 a given set of revenue forecasts cannot be analyzed in a vacuum.
We do not know whether the figures in Table 2 Table 3 do not do justice to his forecasting ability.
rn order to investigate these possibilities, we estimated Table 4 were estimated with 1988 dlted, the results were essentially unchanged. random error.
The rationale behind this specification is that the squared forecast error is a function of innovations in variables like income, and the innovation in a particular variable can be measured by the difference between its actual rate of growth and its trend rate of growth.
(The exception is TAXt, the "surprise" The regression results are presented in 
